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ABSTRACT 
Poverty is commonly cited as a key driver of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, yet little causal evidence exists 
linking economic conditions to actual disease outcomes. Using data on more than 200,000 individuals 
across 19 Sub-Saharan African countries, we present evidence that negative income shocks can lead to 
substantial increases in HIV prevalence, particularly for women in rural areas. Building on recent work 
showing that income shortfalls can induce some women to engage in higher-risk sex, we match data on 
individuals’ HIV status from the Demographic and Health Surveys to data on recent variation in local 
rainfall, a primary (and exogenous) source of variation in income for rural households in Africa. We find 
that infection rates for women (men) in HIV-endemic rural areas increase significantly by 14 percent (11 
percent) for every drought event experienced in the previous 10 years. Further analysis suggests that 
women most affected by the shocks (that is, those engaged in agriculture) are driving the women’s results; 
these women are partnering with men least affected (those employed outside agriculture). Our findings 
suggest a role for formal insurance and social safety nets in tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Keywords:  income shocks, HIV/AIDS, Sub-Saharan Africa vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Poverty has long been thought a key contributor to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
but untangling the causal relationship between economic conditions and HIV/AIDS has proved challenging 
(Beegle and de Walque 2009). Cross-sectional evidence suggests that the relationship between wealth and 
HIV infection in SSA differs widely by country and is often nonmonotonic within countries (see, for 
example, Fortson 2008). Recent work on negative income shocks and HIV-related sexual behavior is 
perhaps more suggestive, with Robinson and Yeh (2011b) finding that women in western Kenya who 
engage in transactional sex increase their supply of riskier, better-compensated sex when faced with 
negative health shocks, and Dinkelman, Lam, and Leibbrandt (2008) showing similar declines in the 
condom use of girls living in South African households exposed to negative economic shocks. 
Understanding whether such behavioral responses are representative of how broader populations might 
respond to changes in economic conditions and how such responses might affect actual disease outcomes 
remain important and unanswered questions. 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between community-level economic shocks and HIV 
prevalence across a wide swath of rural SSA. We model the influence of such shocks on risky sexual 
behavior and HIV prevalence, building on existing evidence that behavioral adjustment on either the 
extensive margin (more partners) or intensive margin (riskiness or frequency of acts) could increase HIV 
infection (see, for example, Stoneburner and Low-Beer 2004). To quantify the effect of local shocks on 
HIV outcomes, we employ the latest rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which contain 
data on actual HIV status for individuals, and we match these data to location-specific measures of 
accumulated drought events over the preceding 10 years.
1 We use drought events as proxies for income 
shocks both because the DHS lack income or expenditure data and because local drought events represent 
plausible exogenous variation in economic outcomes for the majority of Africans who depend on rainfed 
agriculture for their livelihoods.
2 Our empirical strategy thus compares the HIV status of individuals 
exposed to an anomalously high number of droughts in recent years to the status of individuals randomly 
exposed to fewer droughts over the same period within the same country. 
We find large effects of exposure to drought events (shocks) on HIV infection, particularly for 
individuals in rural areas, where there is a large, generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic (greater than 5 percent 
prevalence). For women in these areas, each shock in the past 10 years has led to a statistically significant 
1.2 percentage point (ppt) increase in the likelihood of infection. This is a large effect:  With HIV prevalence 
for this group of 8.3 percent, each rainfall shock amounts to a 14 percent increase in HIV risk. For rural 
men, we find smaller effects in absolute percentages, though similar changes in HIV risk; each shock leads 
to a significant 0.6 ppt increase in HIV rates, which is an 11 percent increase in HIV risk given a group 
prevalence of 5.6 percent. We estimate very small and insignificant point estimates for the effects of shocks 
on HIV rates for both men and women in urban areas, consistent with the relative insensitivity of urban 
incomes to weather-related shocks. Our findings are robust to variations in the definition of drought, to 
alternate sets of controls, and to varying time windows over which droughts can be accumulated. 
Reassuringly, placebo tests using future shocks to explain current HIV prevalence show no effect. 
We explore changes in the underlying market for risky sexual behavior as a response to these 
weather-driven income shocks. Our main results suggest that shocks increase the equilibrium quantity of 
risky sex in the market, which could have occurred through outward shifts in either supply or demand (or 
both). For instance, women may increase their supply of transactional sex during a shock, or men may 
increase their demand for risky sex as the opportunity cost of time declines during a local economic 
downturn. We use available occupational data in the DHS to attempt to distinguish these two stories. We 
                                                       
1 As described in detail below, a drought event is defined as a year in which growing-season rainfall is at or below the 15th 
percentile of local historical rainfall realizations. 
2 Other studies using rainfall variation in SSA as an exogenous shock to income include Miguel (2005), who examined the 
relationship between income and witch killings, and Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001), who examined the relationship between income 
and child health outcomes. 2 
find that shocks disproportionately affect the HIV status of women working in agriculture and men working 
outside of agriculture, which is most consistent with an outward shift in female labor supply: The women 
whose income is most sensitive to these shocks are affected the most, whereas the men whose opportunity 
cost of time should be most affected show little change in their HIV status. Instead, the men whose incomes 
are least affected by drought show the largest HIV response, suggesting a movement along the demand 
curve for those men with enough income to participate in the market. 
Finally, we show that data on self-reported sexual behavior further support the female labor supply 
story, and the data are inconsistent with a number of alternative interpretations of our main results—that is, 
that income shocks cause young women to leave school and become sexually active earlier, that 
drought-related migration might have led to a selected survey sample, and that temporary migration in 
response to negative shocks is driving the HIV increases we observe. 
Our findings contribute to a number of bodies of literature. First, we build directly on recent work 
that explored how the supply of risky sex responds to individual and aggregate-level economic shocks. In 
an innovative set of studies, Robinson and Yeh (2011a, 2011b) monitored the sexual behavior of unmarried 
women in Busia, Kenya, and found that these women engage in transactional sex as a response to current 
and future shocks, such as an illness in their household. Dinkelman, Lam, and Leibbrandt (2008) found that 
girls in South African households experiencing an income shock are less likely to use condoms. Women 
may also respond to positive income shocks; Kohler and Thornton (2010) presented evidence that women 
in Malawi in the week after being rewarded a conditional cash transfer decreased their supply of risky sex. 
Other studies have examined how aggregate-level shocks affect the supply of risky sex. Using the Busia, 
Kenya, sample described above, Dupas and Robinson (2009) found that women increased their likelihood 
of engaging in better-compensated unprotected sex after the disruptions of the 2007 elections in Kenya. 
Wilson (2011) showed that the copper mining boom in Zambia generated higher levels of economic 
prosperity in towns near the copper mines and provided evidence that this positive income shock led to 
reductions in transactional sex in those same towns. 
Our primary contribution is that our findings help generalize the results described above to much 
broader patterns of sexual behavior across highly endemic countries in SSA. We provide evidence that 
suggests that income variation due to weather-related shocks in agricultural productivity may be a 
contributing factor to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in SSA. In addition, our study is one of the first to quantify 
the effect of economic shocks on actual HIV outcomes, rather than on self-reports of sexual behavior. Not 
only are HIV infections the primary outcome of interest for policymakers, but also biological markers of 
risky sex are not subject to the social desirability bias of self-reports on sexual behavior (Padian et al. 2008; 
Cleland et al. 2004). In addition, self-reported measures of sexual behavior may not detect changes on the 
intensive margin, which may be a primary driver of new HIV infections (Beegle and de Walque 2009). 
Given that heterosexual sex is the primary mode of HIV transmission in this context, we believe our work to 
be a powerful confirmation of the existing microliterature on this topic.
3 
In addition, we contribute to the literature that applies economic reasoning to issues surrounding 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in SSA. Work by Oster (forthcoming) has found a relationship between export 
levels and increases in HIV incidence. Such findings are most likely explained by an increase in the 
movement of high-risk individuals—namely, truckers, who are key players in an export-driven economy. 
Fortson (2009), Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2010), and Young (2005) considered how fertility decisions 
respond to existing HIV prevalence. Dupas (2011) found that teenage girls in Kenya respond to information 
about the age gradient of HIV by changing their sexual behavior on the intensive margin. Oster (2007) 
suggested that the muted response of sexual behavior in response to high HIV prevalence may be a result of 
significant competing mortality risks. In contrast, our work considers behavior as a driver of the epidemic 
rather than a response to it. 
                                                       
3 Other means of HIV transmission are using needles infected with HIV (for example, intravenous drug use or vaccines) and 
transfusion from contaminated blood supplies. Although we are unable to rule out these channels, it appears unlikely that economic 
shocks would lead to increases in intravenous drug use or contaminated blood transfusions. Further, in most of our study areas, both 
intravenous drug use and blood transfusions are extremely rare. 3 
Finally, we contribute to a broader body of work on the consequences of shocks on health and 
livelihood outcomes. A host of papers show that when saving is difficult and insurance is incomplete, 
negative shocks can have seriously detrimental effects on longer-run livelihood outcomes. In the context of 
the weather-related agricultural shocks we study here, past work has highlighted the effect of these shocks 
on early life nutrition, as well as their subsequent effect on long-run health and educational outcomes 
(Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Maccini and Yang 2009). Similarly, and using data very close to 
ours, recent work by Kudamatsu, Persson, and Stromberg (2010) showed the widespread effect of drought 
on infant mortality across Africa. Our work highlights a previously unrecognized—and highly 
consequential—mechanism by which some African households cope with uninsured shocks. As such, it 
adds further impetus to the growing effort aimed at increasing access to risk-management tools in the 
developing world. Our results suggest that the return to such efforts could be much higher than previously 
thought. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a conceptual framework that 
predicts the effects to be greatest in rural areas where HIV prevalence is high. The data are presented in 
Section 3, and the main empirical findings, in Section 4. In Section 4, we also show our main result is robust 
to variations in the definition of drought, to alternate sets of controls, and to varying time windows over 
which droughts can be accumulated. In Section 5, we present evidence that the most likely channel for our 
results is a shift out of the supply curve for risky sex, and we rule out alternative explanations. Section 6 
concludes and discusses policy implications. 4 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Why might rainfall shocks affect HIV outcomes? To fix ideas, consider the following relationship: 
                                                               
    
  
 








                                                                                  
where an individual’s probability of HIV infection (   ) is related to the intensity of rainfall shocks (s ) 
via deviations from normal income ( ) and risky sexual behavior ( ). We discuss each of these relationships 
in turn. 
The relationship     
      describes the response of HIV infection to risky sexual behavior ( ). 
We can think of   as measuring either the intensive or extensive margin of risky sex, such as lack of 
condom use or number of sexual partners. There is substantial evidence suggesting that this relationship is 
positive—that is, one’s risk of HIV infection increases in the number of partners (Halperin and Epstein 
2008; Potts et al. 2008; Stoneburner and Low-Beer 2004; Epstein 2007). This relationship will also depend 
on the prevalence of HIV in an area ( ). Regions with higher HIV prevalence will have a stronger 
relationship between risky behaviors and new infections than regions with low prevalence      
        
  . In situations where HIV prevalence is near zero, the relationship between   and HIV will be much more 
muted. 
The relation   
      describes how rainfall shocks translate into income shocks. In rural areas, 
where most income is generated from rainfed agriculture, we expect   
        , or greater deviations from 
average rainfall lead to lower crop yields and reduced income. In urban areas, where agriculture plays a 
smaller role in the local economy, we expect rainfall to have little or no effect on income. 
The relationship   
      describes the impact of a deviation from mean income on an individual’s 
level (or amount) of risky sexual behavior. Existing evidence from sociology, anthropology, and economics 
suggests that   
         for women. In other words, women increase their supply of risky sex in response 
to income shocks. Kohler and Thornton (2010) offered evidence that men’s demand for transactional sex is 
generally increasing in income, which may suggest that it would decrease in the presence of a negative 
income shock, meaning   
         for men. However, there is no evidence on this behavior of which we 
are aware. In aggregate, the sign of   
      is ambiguous and, as such, is an empirical question. 
Given that     
      and   
      are both positive, the relationship we estimate,    
     , will have 
the same sign as the aggregate   
     . In Section 5, we discuss whether the aggregate response is 
dominated by men’s or women’s behavior. 5 
3.  DATA 
Demographic and Health Surveys 
The data on individuals are taken from 21 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted in 19 
different Sub-Saharan countries (Figure 3.1). Of the existing DHS surveys available in early 2011, we 
employ all those that (1) include results from individual-level HIV tests and (2) include longitude and 
latitude information, allowing us to map households to data on shocks.
4 For two countries (Kenya and 
Tanzania), two survey rounds matched these criteria; however, these surveys are separate cross-sections, 
and creation of panel data at the individual or cluster level is not possible. Nonetheless, for Kenya and 
Tanzania, both rounds are included in the analysis as entirely separate surveys. 
Figure 3.1—Countries included in the study  
 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
Note: Included countries are shown in gray. Shades correspond to HIV prevalence as measured in the DHS, with darker gray 
corresponding to higher prevalence. 
Each survey randomly samples clusters of households from stratified regions and then randomly 
samples households within each cluster. In each sampled household, every woman aged 15–49 is asked 
questions regarding health, fertility, and sexual behavior.
5 A men’s sample is composed of all men within a 
specified age range within households selected for the men’s sample.
6 Depending on the survey, households 
                                                       
4 The one exception is the Mali 2001 survey. We must exclude this survey, as it is not possible to link the HIV results to 
individuals in the Geographic Information System–marked clusters. 
5 Mozambique 2009 samples include women up to age 64. 
6 The age range for men is 15 to either 49, 54, 59, or 64, depending on the survey. 6 
selected for the men’s survey are either all sampled households or a random half (or third) of households 
within each cluster. In all households selected for the men’s sample, all surveyed men and women are asked 
to provide a finger-prick blood smear for serotesting.
7 By employing cluster-specific inverse-probability 
sampling weights, the HIV prevalence rates estimated with these data are representative at the national 
level. 
Table 3.1 gives the list of included surveys, along with basic survey information. The compiled 
data contain more than 8,000 clusters. On average, there are 25 surveyed individuals per cluster, and 90 
percent of clusters contain between 10 and 50 surveyed individuals. In total, more than 200,000 individuals 
are in the pooled data. Table 3.1 also shows HIV prevalence rates for each survey. Overall, women’s 
prevalence is 9.2 percent, and men’s is 6.2 percent. However, these numbers mask a range that varies 
widely, from over 30 percent prevalence for women in Swaziland to less than 1 percent prevalence in 
Senegal. Given that the sexual behavior response to economic shocks may have different implications 
depending on HIV risk, we classify countries into two HIV prevalence groups: low-prevalence countries, 
with less than 5 percent prevalence, and high-prevalence countries, with more than 5 percent prevalence. 
Table 3.1—DHS survey information 
          HIV Prevalence 
  Country  Year  Clusters  Individuals  Female  Male  Overall  Category 
1  Swaziland  2007  271  8,186  31.10%  19.70%  25.90%  High 
2  Lesotho  2004  381  5,254  26.40%  18.90%  23.20%  High 
3  Zambia  2007  398  26,098  21.10%  14.80%  18.10%  High 
4  Zimbabwe  2006  319  10,874  16.10%  12.30%  14.20%  High 
5  Malawi  2004  521  5,268  13.30%  10.20%  11.80%  High 
6  Mozambique  2009  270  10,305  12.70%  9.00%  11.10%  High 
7  Tanzania  2008  345  10,743  7.70%  6.30%  7.00%  High 
8  Kenya  2003  399  6,188  8.70%  4.60%  6.70%  High 
9  Kenya  2009  397  6,906  8.00%  4.60%  6.40%  High 
10  Tanzania  2004  466  15,044  6.60%  4.60%  5.70%  High 
11  Cameroon  2004  466  10,195  6.60%  3.90%  5.30%  High 
12  Rwanda  2005  460  10,391  3.60%  2.20%  3.00%  Low 
13  Ghana  2003  412  9,554  2.70%  1.60%  2.20%  Low 
14  Burkina Faso  2003  399  7,530  1.80%  1.90%  1.90%  Low 
15  Liberia  2007  291  11,688  1.90%  1.20%  1.60%  Low 
16  Guinea  2005  291  6,767  1.90%  1.10%  1.50%  Low 
17  Sierra Leone  2008  350  6,475  1.70%  1.20%  1.50%  Low 
18  Ethiopia  2005  529  11,049  1.90%  0.90%  1.40%  Low 
19  Mali  2006  405  8,629  1.50%  1.10%  1.30%  Low 
20  Congo DR  2007  293  8,936  1.60%  0.90%  1.30%  Low 
21  Senegal  2005  368  7,716  0.90%  0.40%  0.70%  Low 
  Total    8031  203,796  9.20%  6.20%  7.80%   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data. 
Note: Prevalence estimates are weighted to be representative at the national level. 
                                                       
7 Testing success rates for each survey are shown by sex in Table A.2. 7 
Historical trends in HIV prevalence for the countries in our study are shown in Figure 3.2. For each 
country, we take the 10 years preceding the survey year and plot yearly estimates of HIV prevalence from 
UNAIDS (2010).
8 For a majority of countries, HIV prevalence had been declining over the 10 years prior to 
the DHS survey. With the exception of Cameroon, the high- and low-prevalence classifications for each 
country had remained stable for the 10 years preceding the survey year. 
Figure 3.2—Pre-survey 10-year HIV trends for low- and high-prevalence countries  
 
Source: UNAIDS (2010). 
The DHS data also provide information on individual characteristics, which we employ as controls 
in our analysis. Level of education is categorized as ―none,‖ ―some primary,‖ ―completed primary,‖ or 
―beyond primary.‖ For nearly all individuals over age 25, this level will have been determined prior to the 
period included in our analysis. 
Weather Data 
Weather data are from the University of Delaware (UDel) dataset, a 0.5 x 0.5–degree gridded monthly 
temperature and precipitation dataset (Matsuura and Willmott 2009).
9 These gridded data are based on 
interpolated weather station data and have global coverage over land areas from 1900–2008. Using the 
latitude and longitude data in the DHS, we match each DHS cluster to the nearest cell in the gridded weather 
data. Because Geographic Information System (GIS) data in the DHS are recorded at the cluster level, all 
individuals within a given cluster are assigned the same weather.
10 Our DHS data match to 1,701 distinct 
grid cells in the UDel data. 
To capture the seasonality of agriculture, we construct cluster-level estimates of ―crop year‖ 
rainfall, where crop year is defined as the 12months following planting for the main growing season in a 
region. Estimates of planting dates are derived from Sacks et al. (2010); planting of staple cereal crops for 
the primary growing season typically occurs in the boreal (northern hemisphere) spring across most of 
western and central Africa, and in the boreal autumn across most of southern Africa. Annual crop year 
estimates are generated by summing monthly rainfall across these 12 crop year months at a given location. 
                                                       
8 Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo are not included in the figures, as UNAIDS does not have historical estimates of 
HIV prevalence for either country. We assume that both countries remained in the low-prevalence category over the past 10 years. 
9 0.5 degrees is roughly 50 kilometers at the equator. 
10 Similarly, clusters within the same grid also have the same observations of weather. 8 
Measuring Weather Shocks 
A drought is generally defined as a prolonged period with below-average rainfall. How far below average 
rainfall must be in order to affect crop yields is not clearly defined, however. Furthermore, a simple 
deviation-from-average measure might be problematic if the distribution of potential rainfall realizations 
differs across regions. For instance, if the total amount of precipitation in a village in a given crop year is a 
random variable drawn from an underlying distribution, then there is no a priori reason that the distribution 
should be normal.
11 If, instead, the amount exhibits a long, positive tail, an occurrence of rainfall that is 
below average—that is, less than the mean—could be quite common and therefore not result in an income 
shock at all. 
We wish to capture occurrences of unusually low rainfall—that is, given the underlying 
distribution of rainfall for a village, what level occurs with only 15 percent probability? We estimate a 
gamma distribution of historical rainfall for each grid, based on annual rainfall observations from 1970 to 
2008.
12 Recovering the shape and scale parameters for each of the 1,701 distributions, we calculate the 15 
percent quantile of each. Crop year rainfall realizations below this cut-off are designated negative shocks, 
and our main independent variable is the number of these shocks that occurred over the 10 years prior to the 
survey year at a given location. For instance, if an individual was surveyed in the DHS in 2007, the shock 
variable takes on a value of between 0 and 10 corresponding to the number of crop year rainfall realizations 
between 1997 and 2006 that fell below the 15 percent cut-off. We choose 10 years because the median 
survival time at infection with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, if untreated, is 9.8 years (Morgan et al. 2002). 
Sensitivity tests repeat the same exercise for the 5, 10, and 20 percent quantiles of the gamma distribution, 
as well as for various periods over which the shocks are allowed to accumulate. 
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of accumulated negative rainfall shocks across our DHS clusters 
over the 10 years preceding the survey year for that cluster. Although we cannot directly show the 
importance of these shocks for household income (as noted above, the DHS do not include income or 
consumption measures), aggregate data suggest that these shocks are economically important. Table 3.2 
shows the impact of rainfall dropping below the 10th or 15th percentile on (log) country-level maize yields 
across Sub-Saharan African countries, based on panel regressions using country and year fixed effects. 
Maize is the most widely grown crop in Africa, and annual maize yields are strongly affected by 
precipitation—for instance, yields are about 12 percent lower in a year with rainfall at or below the 15th 
percentile and 16 percent lower in a year with rainfall below the 10th percentile. Results are robust to 
including temperature shocks in the regression (available on request). With 60–80 percent of rural African 
incomes derived directly from agriculture, these productivity impacts likely represent significant shocks to 
household incomes (Davis et al. 2010).
13 
                                                       
11 In all cases, it will be censored at zero. 
12 The gamma distribution is selected for its considerable flexibility in both shape and scale. The period 1970–2008 was 
chosen to be long enough to be relatively insensitive to the recent shocks of interest, but short enough to capture relatively recent 
averages if long-run means are changing (for example, with climate change). 
13 Schlenker and Lobell (2010) demonstrated that these strong negative impacts of weather shocks generalize to other African 
staples, not just maize. 9 
Figure 3.3—Distribution of clusters by rainfall shocks 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Low rainfall is defined as occurring with less than 15 percent probability, based on cluster-specific historical rainfall 
distribution. 
Table 3.2—Impact of precipitation shocks on yields 
  (1)  (2) 
  Log maize yield  Log maize yield 
10
th percentile shock  –0.161***   
  (0.025)   
15
th percentile shock    –0.122*** 
    (0.023) 
Constant  –0.067  –0.066 
  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Observations  1888  1888 
R squared  0.317  0.316 
Probability of shock  0.083  0.146 
Sources: Yield data from FAO (2010); weather data from Matsuura and Willmott (2009). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The dependent variable is the log of country-level maize yield. Regressions cover years 1961–2008, include country fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, and a constant; and are weighted by country average maize area.  
Because year-to-year changes in rainfall in a given location are typically assumed to be as good as 
randomly assigned, our definition of shocks should help us avoid many of the omitted variables problems 
that generally plague cross-sectional studies of the relationship between income and HIV. To help confirm 
that our measure of rainfall shocks is plausibly exogenous and not correlated with other moments of the 
rainfall distribution, we regress the number of rainfall shocks in the past 10 years on the mean, variance, and 
skewness of each cluster’s rainfall distribution. The worry is that if rainfall shocks are somehow correlated 
with mean rainfall, then it is possible that rainfall shocks are also correlated with unobserved factors that 
 10 
also affect HIV (for example, if wetter areas are somehow wealthier). Table 3.3 presents the results. 
Although the mean and variance of the rainfall distribution are significantly correlated with the number of 
rainfall shocks in the simple bivariate estimations (columns 1 and 3), including survey fixed effects 
weakens this relationship considerably. In all specifications with survey fixed effects, the correlations 
between the number of rainfall shocks and the mean, variance, and skewness of the rainfall distribution are 
not significant. In other words, when we estimate across clusters within a given survey, we find evidence 
that rainfall shocks are orthogonal to all three moments of the distribution. For this reason, we include 
survey fixed effects in our main specifications to ensure that the accumulation of rainfall shocks is 
effectively random.
14 














Log mean rainfall  .362***  .039         
  –.087  (.083)         
Log var rainfall      .262***  –.086     
      (.059)  (.061)     
Skew rainfall          –.207  –.382 
          (.320)  (.244) 
Observations   8031  8031  8031  8031  8031  8031 
R
2  .031  .359  .040  .360  .001  .360 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered on the grid level. The dependent variable is the number of 15 
percent rainfall shocks in the past 10 years. SurveyFE = survey fixed effect. 
                                                       
14 There are a host of other reasons for including survey fixed effects. Innumerable differences across countries exist that we 
cannot observe, including social norms on sexual behavior, male circumcision rates, access to health services, and the national 
response to the AIDS epidemic. Such unobservable differences may also apply to different times within the same country, thus 
motivating a within-survey estimation. 11 
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Estimation 
To estimate the effects of negative income shocks on individual HIV rates, we use the following estimating 
equation: 
                                                                   
       
       
                                                                        
where        is an indicator that individual i  in cluster j  tested HIV positive in survey k .   
  is the 
number of rainfall shocks that cluster j  has experienced in the t  years before the survey. The default 
indicator for   
  is the number of crop years with rainfall at or below the 15 percent quantile for each grid. 
As discussed earlier, the default for t  is the 10 years preceding the survey. Both S  and t  are varied over a 
range to test the robustness of results. 
The vector    contains characteristics of the cluster j , such as location type (rural or urban) and 
historical average rainfall. The vector    contains characteristics of individual i , including gender and age. 
The survey fixed effect is   , and      is a mean-zero error term. We estimate linear probability models, 
allowing for a correlation of error terms across individuals in the same weather grid by clustering standard 
errors at the grid level. Survey-specific sampling weights are used to make the results representative of the 
population of interest, which are rural individuals living in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix A). 
Results 
Table 4.1 shows estimations of equation (2) for the full sample and the rural and urban samples. The overall 
effect of rainfall shocks on HIV rates using the full sample (column 1) is positive (.003) and statistically 
significant. We find strong effects of rainfall shocks on HIV rates in rural areas (column 2) but not in urban 
areas (column 3). This result is expected, because rainfall shocks affect agricultural income, which is 
concentrated in rural areas. In rural areas, we estimate that each shock leads to an increase in HIV 
prevalence that is 9.8 percent of the mean. 








15 PCT shock (10 years)  .003**  .004**  –.001 
  (.001)  (.002)  (.002) 
Male  –.023***  –.016***  –.037*** 
  (.002)  (.002)  (.003) 
Age  .002***  .001***  .003*** 
  (.000)  (.000)  (.000) 
Observations   202216  134874  67342 
R
2  .053  .046  .063 
Mean dependent variable  .050  .041  .070 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Note: All specifications include controls for gender, age, mean rainfall, rural/urban designation, and survey fixed effects. 
Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the 
grid level. 
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As described in Section 2, increases in risky behavior would yield little change in HIV infection 
rates if existing HIV prevalence were very low. There needs to be both an increase in risky sex and a pool of 
potential partners who are HIV positive for HIV rates to increase. To capture these potential differential 
effects by prevalence, we split our sample of individuals into those living in low- and high-prevalence 
countries (see Table 3.1) and estimate the effect of shocks on HIV rates (Table 4.2). Countries with low 
prevalence have an approximately zero effect (Table 4.2, column 1). In countries with high prevalence, 
there is a large effect of nearly one full percentage point, where overall prevalence is 7 percent (column 2). 
This effect is different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level. We disaggregate this effect by gender 
and find that shocks increase the probability of infection by 1.2 percentage points (ppt) for women and 0.6 
ppt for men (columns 3 and 4). For women, this represents a 14 percent increase in HIV risk, given an 
underlying prevalence of 8.3 percent. For men, existing prevalence is 5.7 percent, so the effect of shock on 
men represents an increase of 11 percent. 
Table 4.2—Effect of shocks on HIV in rural areas by country prevalence 










15 PCT shock (10 years)  –.000  .009***  .012***  .006** 
  (.001)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003) 
Observations  57114  77760  43147  34613 
R2  .003  .031  .029  .032 
Mean dependent variable  .010  .070  .083  .057 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Rural sample. All specifications include controls for gender, age, mean rainfall, and survey fixed effects. Estimations are 
weighed to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the grid level. 
Overall, our main results are consistent with the following: (1) rainfall shocks primarily affect the 
incomes of those living in rural areas, (2) females respond to income shocks by engaging in transactional 
sex, (3) this behavioral response leads to higher HIV infection rates for both females and males, and (4) this 
shock-related rise in infection rates is absent in countries with very low prevalence, where increased 
amounts of risky sex would not be expected to significantly affect infection rates. 
Robustness Checks 
We conduct a variety of robustness checks on our main results for rural areas in high-prevalence countries. 
We first vary the estimating equation by changing the individual and cluster-level controls. We also vary 
both the time window in which rain shocks occur and the definition of a rainfall shock. Overall, our results 
are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. 
We first show that our main results are not sensitive to variations in respondent age across different 
surveys (see Table A.1). Employing a consistent age group across all surveys (age 15 to 49) changes our 
estimated effect in rural areas of high-prevalence countries from .009 to .010 and does not affect precision 
(Table 4.3, column 1). We also estimate the effects of rainfall shocks on HIV without individual and 
cluster-level controls (column 2), without sampling weights (column 3), and replacing the survey fixed 
effects with country and year fixed effects (column 4); our results remain consistent throughout these 
alternative specifications. Finally, we remove two hyperendemic countries (an HIV prevalence of greater 
than 20 percent), Lesotho and Swaziland, and find very similar results. 
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Table 4.3—Robustness checks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






CoYrFE  No 
Hyperendemic 
w/Temp 
15 PCT shock (10 years)  .010***  .008**  .005*  .009***  .009***  .010*** 
  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
15 PCT temp. shock            -.008*** 
            (.003) 
Observations  75570  77760  77760  77760  68287  77760 
R
2  .034  .020  .068  .031  .026  .032 
Mean dependent variable  .070  .070  .110  .070  .068  .070 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Rural sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for gender, age, mean rainfall, and survey 
fixed effects, except as noted. Estimations are weighed to be representative of the 19 countries, except as noted. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the grid level. CoYrFE = country and year fixed effects. 
We also show that our results do not depend on using a 10-year window for the timing of the 
rainfall shocks. We vary this window to include shocks from the preceding 5, 7, or 13 years, rather than 10 
(Table 4.4; columns 1–3). In each instance, the point estimate remains stable and statistically significant. 
Table 4.4—Robustness to length of shock window and placebo test 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
15 PCT shock past 5 years  .007*         
  (.004)         
15 PCT shock past 7 years    .009***       
    (.004)       
15 PCT shock past 13 years      .009***     
      (.003)     
15 PCT shock 2 years ahead        .003   
        (.007)   
15 PCT shock 3 years ahead          .001 
          (.006) 
Observations   77760  77760  77760  67436  49523 
R
2  .030  .031  .031  .039  .045 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Rural sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for gender, age, mean rainfall, and survey 
fixed effects. Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
clustered at the grid level. 
Another concern is that shocks could somehow be proxying for other time-invariant cluster 
characteristics that are also associated with HIV risk, causing us to conflate the effect of shocks with some 
other unobservable.
15 We test for potential confounders using rainfall shocks that occur after the survey 
year of each sample. Given that the DHS surveys were conducted between 2003 and 2009 and our weather 
data end in 2008, we are not able to use similar time windows (that is, 10 years) that we use for our main 
                                                       
15 Note that by construction, this is presumably not the case: The number of shocks a given location experienced over the past 
10 years should be random. 14 
analysis. Instead, we create two time windows: (1) all shocks two years after the survey year, and (2) all 
shocks three years after the survey year (Table 4.4; columns 4–5). This placebo test suggests that our 
presurvey shocks measure is unlikely to be proxying for other factors that also affect HIV risk. 
We also check that our estimates are not sensitive to the definition of a shock. Defining shocks as 
annual rainfall with a probability of less than 5, 10, or 20 percent produces estimates consistent with the 15 
percent definition. Employing a simpler definition of shocks as rainfall that is 1.5 standard deviations or 
more below the grid’s long-term mean provides similar estimates as well (results shown in Table B.2) 15 
5.  DISCUSSION: PATHWAYS 
The results shown here clearly suggest that HIV infections are increasing in rainfall shocks. Based on the 
framework presented in Section 2, this implies that the response of risky sexual behavior to negative 
income shocks is positive as well (  
        ). In this section, we present evidence that increasing risky 
sex to offset income shortfalls is indeed the pathway by which rainfall shocks affect HIV infections. 
We first check for supporting evidence that shocks do affect sexual behavior by examining 
self-reported data. Next, we endeavor to determine whether the hypothesized increases in risky or 
transactional sex result from an increase in supply by women or an increase in men’s demand. Secondary 
analysis suggests that the effects result solely from an increase in women’s supply. Finally, we consider 
possible links between rainfall shocks and HIV other than increased risky sex that could be explaining our 
results. Rejecting the ability of each of these to generate the results shown here, we conclude that indeed the 
pathway connecting rainfall and HIV is as proposed. 
Self-Reported Sexual Behavior 
To lend further credence to a behavior response to income shocks, we examine self-reports of sexual 
behavior. There are several caveats to this analysis. First, a large body of evidence suggests that 
self-reported sexual behavior is biased (Cleland et al. 2004) due to social desirability bias. Second, the data 
that are available for sexual behavior do not capture all aspects of risky behavior that could lead to HIV 
infection. For example, the type of sexual partner you have (for example, a commercial sex worker or an 
individual with multiple partners) will affect the likelihood of HIV infection, and these data are not 
available.
16 Finally, several of the measures we have of sexual behavior are for recent behavior (12 months 
prior to the survey). Thus, unless sexual behavior is persistent, income shocks in the past may not affect 
more recent sexual behavior.
17 To deal with this, we differentiate between the number of recent shocks (that 
is, within the past five years) and the number of earlier shocks (5–10 years ago). Given these caveats, we 
proceed to examine whether shocks affect self-reported sexual behavior. 
Table 5.1 shows results of estimating equation (2) with alternate self-reported sexual behaviors as 
the dependent variable. We first look at the number of lifetime sexual partners an individual reports 
(column 1) and find that each shock in the past 10 years increases the average number of partners per person 
by 0.21. Although this is only a 3 percent increase, the effect is significant at the 1 percent level, despite the 
reduced sample size, as this question was not asked in all surveys. This serves as a strong indicator that 
shocks increase sexual partnerships. 
   
                                                       
16 See Dupas (2011) for a discussion of the importance of partner selection in HIV risk. 
17 An additional concern is that coefficient estimates will be biased if exposure to shocks changes how an individual reports 
her sexual behavior without actually changing her sexual behavior. 16 
Table 5.1—Effect on shocks on self-reported behavior 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Long-term 
Partners 
Sexually Active  Multiple Partners  Condom Use 
15 PCT shock (10 years)  .209***       
  (.077)       
Recent 15 PCT shocks    .020*  .023***  –.027 
    (.011)  (.006)   (.035) 
Earlier 15 PCT shocks    .015  017***    .005 
    (.009)  (.005)   (.030) 
Observations  50298  77753  56352  8525 
R
2  .144  .128    .098    .060 
Mean dependent var  6.000  .738    .208    .482 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Rural sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for gender, age, mean rainfall, and survey 
fixed effects. Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
clustered at the grid level. 
In columns 2–4 of Table 5.1, we examine indicators of sexual behavior in the 12 months prior to the 
survey. We find that recent shocks lead to a small increase (0.02) in the probability of being sexually active. 
Further, conditional on being sexually active, shocks lead to a higher likelihood of engaging in multiple 
partnerships within the year (column 3). For each shock in the past five years, the chance of having multiple 
partners this year is increased by more than 10 percent (significant at the 1 percent level). Interestingly, 
shocks more than five years ago seem to have persistent effects, increasing the chance of multiple 
partnerships each year by 8 percent. We find no significant impact of shocks on condom use with a 
nonspouse partner, conditional on having a nonspouse partner. This seems to suggest that any increases in 
p, as defined in Section 2, arise from increased partnerships rather than from increased risk per encounter. 
Increased Supply or Increased Demand? 
Existing literature suggests that some African women respond to income shortfalls by increasing their 
supply of transactional sex, either for income smoothing or simply for survival. The clear increase in HIV 
infections resulting from rainfall shocks implies that shocks are associated with an increase in the quantity 
of risky sex occurring. 
To formalize ideas, consider a market for transactional sex where the quantity traded (S ) 
represents time spent engaged in transactions.
18 Both women and men have a limited amount of time 
available, which we normalize to unity. Women divide their time among working for a wage     leisure 
time l , and supplying S  in order to maximize their utility function 
   
                          
                             , 
where    ) is health status as a function of risky sexual behavior,   is aggregate consumption, and    is 
the market price for sex.
19 We assume that    is increasing in      and l  at a decreasing rate, and that H  
is decreasing in S  at a decreasing rate. 
                                                       
18 This could be extended so that S may also represent an index of riskiness of the average encounter. Gertler, Shah, and 
Bertozzi (2005) showed that riskier sex (for example, without a condom) brings a price premium in the commercial sex market, 
suggesting that riskiness itself is a marketable good. 
19 We set the price of C as the numeraire. 17 
Men divide their time among working for wage   , engaging in sex,  , and all other leisure time,  . 
Men will demand   to maximize their utility function 
   
                        
                               , 
where men derive utility from general consumption (C), from sex, and from other leisure.  
Market equilibrium requires that 
       
      
      . 
Our empirical results suggest that the equilibrium quantity is increasing in rainfall shocks, 
suggesting that shocks cause an outward shift in the supply curve, an outward shift in demand, or both. 
We note that 
   
   
. 
In other words, women will increase supply whenever their wages decrease. However, for men, the 
demand for sex ambiguously responds to changes in wage.
20 Decreased men’s wages will lower the budget 
constraint, reducing the quantity of S demanded at a given price. However, decreased wages also reduce the 
opportunity cost of time spent in leisure and engaging in sex. If men substitute time away from working and 
toward leisure activities, this could potentially increase demand. Whether the income effect or substitution 
effect will dominate is essentially an empirical question, which we consider below. 
Although we do not observe wages in our data, we do observe occupation, and we would expect 
different occupations to be differentially affected by negative rainfall shocks. In particular, it seems likely 
that individuals employed in agriculture would differentially suffer reduced wages as a result of rainfall 
shocks. If increased transactional sex is being driven by an increase in supply, we would expect women’s 
results to differ across occupational sector (greater for agricultural women), and we would expect results to 
be consistent across both sectors for men, reflecting a reduced price for sex. On the other hand, if the change 
is driven by an increase in demand, we would expect men’s effects to be greatest among agriculturalists, 
and women’s effects to be consistent across both sectors, reflecting an increase in price. We therefore 
examine the effects of shocks disaggregated by sex and occupation. 
A practical concern in our data is that we are able to classify individuals by their employment type 
at the time of the survey but not at the time of the shock.
21 We therefore assume that employment type is 
roughly persistent—individuals in agriculture at the time of the survey are more likely to have been in 
agriculture at the time of the shock. In order to avoid bias, we check whether the experience of shocks 
affects occupational choice and find that it does not (results available on request).
22 Nevertheless, we 
interpret the following results with caution. 
Table 5.2 shows differential effects of shocks on HIV by gender and occupation. We find results 
consistent with a small decrease in demand that is dominated by a significantly increased supply, yielding 
an increased equilibrium quantity. Women’s effects are strongly concentrated among agriculturalists; the 
effect for other women is not statistically different from zero. This result supports increased supply and 
rejects increased demand.   
                                                       
20 A specific functional form of utility may have unambiguous predictions for this response. However, we are hesitant to 
impose such strong assumptions. 
21 An advantage of classification by employment type is that we are able to differentiate women in urban areas who are 
employed in agriculture versus nonagriculture. For this analysis, we therefore do not condition on the rural sample. 
22 As an additional robustness check, we limit the sample to those who were over 30 years of age at the time of the survey, as 
these types might have been less likely to have switched their type of employment, and our results are similar. 18 
Table 5.2—Effect shocks by employment type 
  Women  Men 
  In Agriculture  Nonagriculture  In Agriculture  Nonagriculture 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
15 PCT shock (10 years)  .013***  .006  .005  .016** 
  (.004)  (.006)  (.003)  (.007) 
Observations  20586  16901  17145  8652 
R
2  .020  .036  .021  .044 
Mean dependent variable  .077  .148  .056  .096 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for age, mean rainfall, and survey fixed effects. 
Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the 
grid level. 
Given an increase in supply, we assume that the price of sex decreases and that the quantity 
demanded will increase for all men, even if demand does not shift out (that is, a move along the demand 
curve). However, what we find is that quantity demanded (as proxied by HIV infections) significantly 
increases only for men working outside agriculture. The increase for these men nearly mirrors that of 
agricultural women, suggesting that women seeking to compensate for income shortfalls partnered with the 
men least affected by the shock. We cannot statistically distinguish the effect for agricultural men from 
zero, suggesting that, given lower prices, the demand curve must have shifted inward in response to 
decreases in wage. 
Although we cannot reject the null that shocks have the same effect for women (men) in agriculture 
versus non-agriculture, these results provide some evidence that our main findings on HIV are driven by a 
shift out in the supply curve rather than a shift in demand. When a drought occurs, women in agriculture are 
most affected and increase their supply of risky sex to compensate for the income shortfall; and it is the men 
in the nonagricultural sector, whose incomes are relatively less affected by drought, who appear to be 
partnering with these women. 
As further evidence on the role of supply shifts, we explore whether women who are likely to have 
alternative coping mechanisms or income-generating opportunities beyond transactional sex respond 
differentially to shocks. In particular, we might expect responses to shocks to vary by educational levels, 
with more educated women having other income-generating opportunities and thus being less likely to 
engage in transactional sex in response to a shock. 
To test for this, we include an indicator for whether an individual completed primary school in our 
main specifications and interact it with the measure of shocks. We find that shocks have a significantly 
different effect on women who are primary school graduates (Table 5.3; column 1).
23 Women without 
primary school are 1.8 percentage points more likely to be infected with HIV per shock, whereas shocks 
have no statistically significant effect on women who are primary school graduates.
24 Because educational 
decisions might have been affected by these shocks, we also limit the sample to women age older than 30 at 
the time of the survey, who would likely have completed their education before our shocks  of interest occur. 
We find nearly identical significant effects for this sample (Table 5.3; column 3), despite the reduction in 
sample size. We interpret this as further evidence in support of an outward shift in female supply as the 
driver of these results. 
   
                                                       
23 We also include controls for household assets in these specifications to differentiate the effects of education versus wealth. 
24 The linear combination of Shocks + (Shocks x Primary School) has p = 0.46. 19 
Table 5.3—Women’s education mitigates the effect of shocks 
  All  Age 30+ 








15 PCT shock (10 years)  .018***  .013  .019***  .010 
  (.004)  (.009)  (.006)  (.012) 
Primary school  .024**  .005  .038**  –.009 
  (.011)  (.018)  (.015)  (.027) 
Shock X primary school  –.014**  –.012  –.016**  –.015 
  (.006)  (.009)  (.008)  (.014) 
Observations  20585  16901  10657  8217 
R
2  .024  .039  .028  .055 
Mean dependent variable  .077  .148  .088  .178 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Female sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for age, mean rainfall, and survey fixed 
effects. Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered 
at the grid level. 
Other Pathways? 
In the remainder of this section, we explore other explanations for a link between rainfall shocks and HIV, 
in particular focusing on the results for women. 
Early School Leaving  
One possible channel is that income shocks cause rural women to leave school prematurely, which may 
lead them to be sexually active at an earlier age (Baird et al. 2009). In this case, absent any transactional sex, 
shocks would still be correlated with HIV infection. If this were occurring, we would expect the effects to 
be concentrated in the women who were of schooling age when the shocks occurred. 
In Table 5.4, we divide the sample into four categories based on age at the time of survey, and we 
re-estimate the main equation for each. Women age 15–20 at the survey ranged in age from 5 to 19 over the 
preceding 10 years—prime schooling age (column 1). In contrast, women age 32–49 at the survey were 
aged 22 or older when any of the shocks occurred, an age past which these women are unlikely to be in 
school. We find that women well past schooling age at the time of the shocks (columns 3 and 4) exhibit 
statistically significant results similar to our primary results. The estimated effect on women age 5 to 19 at 
the time is smaller and is not statistically different from zero. Given these estimates, it is unlikely that 
school leaving is the primary driver of our results. As a final check, we regress self-reported age of first 
sexual activity (sexual debut) on our shock variable and find no significant relationship (column 5). 
Table 5.4—Are school-age females driving results? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Age 15–20  Age 21–31  Age 32–41  Age 42+  Debut 
15 PCT shock (10 years)  0.002  0.017***  0.012**  0.015**  –0.030 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.047) 
Observations  11440  16156  9604  5850  36997 
R
2  0.020  0.036  0.042  0.027  0.036 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Female rural sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for age, mean rainfall, and survey 
fixed effects. Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
clustered at the grid level. 20 
Permanent Migration  
Another potential alternative explanation is the possibility of selective permanent outmigration from rural 
areas in the event of droughts. If certain types respond to shocks by permanently migrating, and if these 
types are more likely to be HIV negative, then the remaining population would be disproportionately HIV 
positive. This too could cause a correlation between shocks and HIV, absent any sexual behavior response. 
To test whether selective migration can account for our results, we simulate the replacement of the assumed 
migrants into the sample. 
In adding such ghost individuals to our data, two questions arise:  
(1) How many people leave as a result of a shock? and  
(2) What was the HIV prevalence of those who left?  
Several calculations are performed in order to answer question (1), which are detailed in Appendix 
C. The calculations suggest that an assumption of 3 percent population loss per shock approaches reality, 
with 5 percent as an extreme upper bound. The second question is to what degree the individuals who 
migrated were less likely to be HIV positive than those who stayed. In order to be as conservative as 
possible, we assume that every migrant was HIV negative. We then create enough ghost women to increase 
the female population in each cluster according to the schedule shown in Table C.1 for the 3 percent and 5 
percent assumptions. 
Table 5.5 reproduces our primary result: In high-prevalence countries, rural women’s probability 
of infection increases by 1.2 percentage points per shock. The second column shows the same estimation 
based on data that include the additional ghost migrants under the 3 percent assumption. We see that 
although the point estimate is mechanically reduced, the phenomenon cannot fully explain the positive and 
statistically significant results we estimate. 
Table 5.5—Accounting for potential permanent migration 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Observed  3%  5% 
15 PCT shock 10 years  .012***  .009**  .007** 
  (.004)  (.003)  (.003) 
Observations  43147  46537  49313 
R
2  .025  .027  .028 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Female rural sample from high-prevalence countries. All specifications include controls for age, mean rainfall, and survey 
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) include additional observations to account for outmigration (see text). Estimates are weighted to 
be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the grid level. 
In the third column, we repeat the entire exercise under the upper-bound 5 percent assumption and 
find that, even accounting for massive outmigration (up to 30 percent in some clusters), we can still reject 
that the effect is zero. It does not appear that sample selection due to outmigration cannot explain the effects 
we find. 
Temporary Migration  
Although permanent migration as a result of shocks appears unlikely to explain our main results, it could 
still be that temporary migration explains the observed relationship between shocks and HIV. One story 
could be that rural individuals—in particular, males—migrate temporarily to cities in the face of negative 
income shocks, are sexually active and become infected with HIV in the city, and return to the countryside 
and infect their spouses. Although we do not directly observe shock-related temporary migration in our 
data, we indirectly explore the possibility by interacting our shock measure with estimates of whether a 21 
rural household is near an urban area. The assumption is that individuals are more likely to migrate to urban 
areas in response to shocks if they reside closer to urban areas. If the shock-related migration story were 
true, then we would expect shocks to have a smaller effect on HIV in areas more distant from urban areas. 
Our measures of distance from the nearest urban area, as well as the population size of settled areas, 
are derived from the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (CIESIN 2010). We assume that households 
within 100 kilometers of an urban area are near that area, and we vary the population threshold that qualifies 
a settlement as being urban (100,000 inhabitants, 250,000 inhabitants, or 500,000 inhabitants). Population 
data are from the year 2000, helping to mitigate concerns that urban population size could have responded 
to the shocks of interest (for most of our sample, the shocks of interest are post-2000). 
Results are shown in Table 5.6. If temporary urban migration were driving our results, then the 
interaction between our shock measure and the indicator for ―near urban area‖ should be positive. Our data 
do not suggest that to be the case. The coefficient on the interaction is generally very small and statistically 
insignificant for both men and women; in the one case where the coefficient is significant, it is of the 
opposite sign than the migration story would suggest. Thus, there is little evidence that temporary migration 
is driving our results. 
Table 5.6—Checking for effects from temporary migration 
  Women  Men 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  100K  250K  500K  100K  250K  500K 
15 PCT shock (10 years)  0.011***  0.014***  0.012
***  0.006
*  0.007**  0.006
** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Near urban  0.010  0.048
***  0.019  0.012  0.022  0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
Shock x Near urban  0.003  –0.024
***  –0.003  0.001  –0.007  0.008 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Observations  43147  43147  43147  34613  34613  34613 
R
2  0.030  0.030  0.029  0.033  0.033  0.032 
Source: Locale populations from CIESIN (2010). 
Notes: Rural sample from high-prevalence countries. The near urban variable indicates whether a given cluster is within 100 
kilometers of an urban area (defined as the population size in the column header). All specifications include controls for age, mean 
rainfall, and survey fixed effects. Estimations are weighted to be representative of the 19 countries. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses clustered at the grid level. 22 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Understanding the economic roots of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is of clear interest to both policymakers and 
academics. Previous work has been largely unable to demonstrate whether economic conditions exert 
causal influence on HIV outcomes among broad populations of interest. Anecdotal reports and an intriguing 
new microliterature suggest that in the face of economic hardship, women in SSA supply transactional sex 
in order to smooth consumption. By women increasing partnerships or increasing the risks taken within 
existing partnerships, it seems plausible that this shock-induced behavioral response could contribute 
significantly to increasing the risk of HIV transmission. 
We investigate whether such behavioral responses to income shocks yield significant increases in 
HIV infections across SSA. In 19 African countries, we match an individual’s serostatus test results to 
information on recent fluctuations in local economic conditions. Lacking any direct information on income 
variation at the individual level, we proxy village-level economic shocks by the number of droughts 
experienced over the preceding 10 years. In rural African areas, the majority of income is derived from 
agriculture and nearly all farming is rainfed; therefore, these shocks represent one of the most important 
sources of rural income variation on the continent. 
In countries with severe epidemics (5 percent prevalence or higher), we find that a crop year rainfall 
realization below the 15th percentile of historical realizations (that is, what we deem a negative rainfall 
shock) increases the risk of HIV by 14 percent for rural women and 11 percent for rural men. Examination 
of self-reported data on sexual behavior reveals that those exposed to shocks have more lifetime partners 
and are more likely to have multiple concurrent partnerships. This supports the theory that increased HIV 
rates result from increases in risky or transactional sex. Based on a simple model of the transactional sex 
market, we explore whether an increase in transactional sex is attributable to an outward shift in women’s 
supply curve or to an outward shift in men’s demand. We find that the effects for women are concentrated 
among those most affected by the shocks (those working in agriculture), whereas for men, they are among 
those unaffected by the shock (that is, those employed in nonagricultural jobs). This rules out an increase in 
demand and provides evidence for an increase in supply. We find little evidence for alternative pathways in 
our data: Results are not driven by young women who terminate schooling early as a result of shocks, nor 
do they appear to be driven by permanent or temporary outmigration from shocked villages. 
The findings presented here provide strong evidence that changes in sexual behavior in response to 
economic shocks are an important contributing factor in the AIDS epidemic in Africa. Further, it seems that 
such behavior is specifically motivated by the vulnerability of rural women. Efforts to protect target groups 
from income volatility could thus pay large social dividends. Comprehensive social safety nets may be an 
unrealistic short-run goal for many revenue- and capacity-constrained governments on the continent. 
However, more targeted interventions, such as crop insurance or the development of drought-resistant crop 
varieties, could stem the spread of HIV by mitigating the sexual response to negative agricultural shocks. 
Our results suggest that the social returns to investments in these and related interventions could be much 
larger than previously thought, particularly in countries where HIV prevalence remains high. 23 
APPENDIX A: FURTHER DATA DETAILS  
Table A.1—DHS sampling for serostatus testing 
Country  Year  Men Aged  Women Aged 
Testing in all sampled households 
Mozambique  2009  12–64  12–64 
Swaziland*  2007  15–49  15–49 
Tanzania  2004, 2008  15–49  15–49 
Liberia  2007  15–49  15–49 
Zimbabwe  2006  15–54  15–49 
Zambia  2007  15–59  15–49 
Ghana  2003  15–59  15–49 
Testing in random 50% of sampled households 
Sierra Leone**  2008  6–59  6–59 
Kenya  2003, 2009  15–49  15–49 
Lesotho  2004  15–59  15–49 
Cameroon  2004  15–59  15–49 
Congo DR  2007  15–59  15–49 
Ethiopia  2005  15–59  15–49 
Guinea  2005  15–59  15–49 
Rwanda  2005  15–59  15–49 
Testing in random 33% of sampled households 
Malawi  2004  15–54  15–49 
Burkina Faso  2003  15–59  15–49 
Mali  2006  15–59  15–49 
Senegal  2005  15–59  15–49 
Source: Author’s calculations using DHS data. 
Notes: * Swaziland: additional HIV testing for those aged 12–14 and 50 and older in a random 50% of sampled households. 
** Sierra Leone: Individual questionnaires were administered only to those aged 15–49 (59 for men). 
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Table A.2—Nonresponse for serostatus testing 
    Men  Women 
Country  Year  Tested  Refused  Tested  Refused 
Lesotho  2004  68%  16.6%  81%  12.0% 
Swaziland  2007  78%  16.6%  87%  9.5% 
Zimbabwe  2006  63%  17.4%  76%  13.2% 
Malawi  2004  63%  21.9%  70%  22.5% 
Mozambique  2009  92%  6.1%  92%  6.1% 
Zambia  2007  72%  17.6%  77%  18.4% 
Cameroon  2004  90%  5.6%  92%  5.4% 
Kenya  2003  70%  13.0%  76%  14.4% 
Kenya  2009  79%  7.8%  86%  8.2% 
Tanzania  2008  80%  8.0%  90%  6.3% 
Tanzania  2004  77%  13.9%  84%  12.3% 
Burkina Faso  2003  86%  6.6%  92%  4.4% 
Congo DR  2007  86%  5.7%  90%  4.4% 
Ethiopia  2005  75%  12.6%  83%  11.2% 
Ghana  2003  80%  10.7%  89%  5.7% 
Guinea  2005  88%  8.5%  93%  5.0% 
Liberia  2007  80%  11.3%  87%  7.3% 
Mali  2006  84%  4.8%  92%  3.2% 
Rwanda  2005  96%  1.9%  97%  1.1% 
Sierra Leone  2008  85%  5.5%  88%  4.7% 
Senegal  2005  76%  16.0%  85%  9.9% 
Average    79%  11%  86%  9% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS data. 
Note: Rates are for the full HIV testing sample, with the exception of Mozambique. Rates for Mozambique are for the 15–49 
sample. 
Weighting 
Sampling weights are used in this paper, so that estimated effects represent the average effect of the 
population of interest (the population of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries). The sampling weights are 
constructed as follows: 
Each individual is assigned an inflation factor that is             , where    is the sample size for the 
survey in which he appears, and    is the population of his country in the year of that survey. 
Each individual has a survey-specific inflation factor  , which is provided in the DHS data.   is the 
inverse probability of his HIV test results being present in the data. MEASURE DHS calculates   based on 
an individual’s probability of being sampled for HIV testing (based on stratification of the survey) and his 
probability of providing a blood sample if requested, based on observable characteristics. 
A composite weight that is the product of   and   is employed in all specifications. A robustness 
check shows that the primary results of this work are not dependent on the use of sampling weights. 25 
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table B.1—Frequency of rain shocks over 10 years 
      Number of Shocks   
Survey    HIV Rank  0  1  2  3  4+  Total Clusters 
Swaziland  2007  1  0  0  44  211  16  271 
Lesotho  2004  2  0  60  302  19  0  381 
Zambia  2007  3  114  148  52  5  0  319 
Zimbabwe  2006  4  51  209  115  23  0  398 
Malawi  2004  5  129  248  137  7  0  521 
Mozambique  2009  6  13  68  59  66  64  270 
Tanzania  2008  7  6  156  212  58  34  466 
Kenya  2003  8  47  237  114  1  0  399 
Kenya  2009  9  66  198  112  21  0  397 
Tanzania  2004  10  153  132  47  13  0  345 
Cameroon  2004  11  68  167  140  78  13  466 
Rwanda  2005  12  0  31  229  200  0  460 
Ghana  2003  13  45  236  88  43  0  412 
Burkina Faso  2003  14  107  85  200  4  3  399 
Liberia  2007  15  101  13  151  26  0  291 
Guinea  2005  16  49  95  147  0  0  291 
Sierra Leone  2008  17  0  0  0  350  0  350 
Ethiopia  2005  18  205  149  89  80  6  529 
Mali  2006  19  96  221  81  7  0  405 
Congo DR  2007  20  30  58  146  37  22  293 
Senegal  2005  21  154  172  39  3  0  368 
Total      1434  2683  2504  1252  158  8031 
Percent of clusters      18%  33%  31%  16%  2%  100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
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Table B.2—Effects of shocks of varying size 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  5 PCT  10 PCT  15 PCT  20 PCT  1.5 SD 
5 PCT shock past 10 years  .012*         
  (.007)         
10 PCT shock past 10 years    .011**       
    (.005)       
15 PCT shock (10 years)      .012
***     
      (.004)     
20 PCT shock past 10 years        .006*   
        (.003)   
1.5 SD shocks past 10 years          .017
** 
          (.008) 
Observations  43147  43147  43147  43147  43147 
R
2  .028  .028  .029  .028  .029 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses clustered at the grid level. All specifications use the rural female sample 
from high-prevalence countries and include controls for age, mean rainfall, rural/urban designation, and survey fixed effects. All 
specifications are weighted to be representative at the national level. Parameter estimates significantly different from zero at 99 
(***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. 27 
APPENDIX C: RURAL POPULATION LOSS ARISING FROM SHOCKS 
We could make a variety of assumptions regarding the share of a rural village that migrates during a shock. 
The column headers in Table C.1 show several possible assumptions ranging from 1 to 10 percent per 
shock. A bit of algebra reveals that if, for example, 5 percent of the population were to leave during each 
shock, a village with three shocks over the past 10 years would lose 14.3 percent of its population in that 
time. The calculation of lost population by number of shocks and assumption maintained are shown in 
Table C.1. By applying these calculations to the rural clusters in our data according to each cluster’s 
number of shocks, we calculate the total population lost in our rural sample over the 10 years before the 
applicable survey. The bottom row of Table C.1 shows these estimates. 
Table C.1—Potential reductions in rural populations due to shock-induced migration 
  Share of Population Emigrating per Shock 
Shocks / 10 yrs  1%  3%  5%  7%  10% 
0  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
1  1.00%  3.00%  5.00%  7.00%  10.00% 
2  1.99%  5.91%  9.75%  13.51%  19.00% 
3  2.97%  8.73%  14.26%  19.56%  27.10% 
4  3.94%  11.47%  18.55%  25.19%  34.39% 
5  4.90%  14.13%  22.62%  30.43%  40.95% 
6  5.85%  16.70%  26.49%  35.30%  46.86% 
7  6.79%  19.20%  30.17%  39.83%  52.17% 
Estimate of total population 
reduction based on number of 
shocks observed in our data 
1.44%  4.26%  7.01%  9.69%  13.59% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DHS and UDel data. 
Notes: Each cell represents the 10-year population loss in a cluster that has occurrences of shocks (as given by the row) and 
population loss per shock (as given by the column). The last row represents the assumed total loss from the rural sample based on 
the shocks observed in the data, under the various assumptions of population loss per shock (as given by the column). 
For each country in our sample, we calculate the reduction in rural population (as a share of total 
population) over a recent 10-year period, based on data from the World Bank.
25 On average, the rural share 
of the populations of these countries is reduced by 5.8 percent over 10 years. Based on the assumption that 
3 percent of a village leaves during each shock, we estimate that our rural sample lost 4.26 percent of its 
population in the past 10 years; an assumption of 5 percent leaving yields a total decline of 7.01 percent. 
This result suggests that an assumption of 3 percent population loss per shock approaches reality, with 5 
percent as an extreme upper bound. 
                                                       
25 Figures from World Bank Development Indicators, 1990–2000. 28 
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